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Abstract 
The commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) crops is being accompanied by a debate 
with scientific, social, ethical, legal and metaphysical dimensions. In the face of this complex 
debate, governments need to regulate GM crops in a way that minimises negative impacts 
on biological and social environments. This paper is a critical examination of Australia’s 
regulatory framework for the deliberate environmental release of GM crops, specifically in 
terms of its ability to advance ecologically and socially sustainable agriculture. Following a 
description of the novel nature of GM crops, I discuss how the approach selected, the 
definition of key terms and the parties being granted influence exclude social and ethical 
concerns from regulatory deliberation and threaten the development of socially sustainable 
agriculture. Threats to ecologically sustainable agriculture from the framing of GM crop 
regulation are discussed in relation to how the selected approach deals with ecological 
uncertainties and the baseline being used for acceptable risk comparisons. 
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Introduction 
The commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) crops is a socially contested 
technological development that is being accompanied by a debate which has scientific, 
social, ethical, legal and metaphysical dimensions. This paper uses the criteria of social and 
ecological sustainability to critically examine the way Australia is currently regulating the 
deliberate environmental release of these controversial organisms. These criteria come from 
a ‘triple bottom line’ approach to the notion of sustainability. In the triple bottom line 
approach, there are seen to be three primary components to the sustainability concept: that 
is, economic sustainability, ecological sustainability and social sustainability.  There has been 
much debate in Australia over the issue of the economic sustainability of agricultural systems 
employing GM crops, particularly the economic sustainability of growing GM canola in 
Australia, and while this is an area that is certainly worthy of further research, the 
consideration of Australia’s GM crop regulation from a position of economic sustainability is 
not within the scope of this paper. In this paper I critically examine Australia’s regulation of 
GM crops using the other two components of a triple bottom line approach to sustainability, 
the social and ecological criteria.  
In referring to socially sustainable agriculture, this paper is concerned with the ability of our 
current regulatory approach to address concerns within our society relating to GM crops and 
to advance a form of agriculture which is capable of maintaining social trust and support. 
While socially sustainable agriculture may be defined more broadly than this to include 
aspects such as maintaining the structure and vitality of rural communities, in this paper I 
limit my definition of social sustainability to the consideration of social concerns and the 
maintenance of social trust and support. 
Ecologically sustainable agriculture is being defined in this paper as agriculture which does 
not threaten the long term health and functioning of ecological systems and processes and 
which does not create irreversible negative impacts on the environment. In using these 
criteria of socially and ecologically sustainable agriculture to examine Australia’s regulation of 
GM crops, this paper discusses the regulatory approach which has been selected, the 
definition of key terms, the parties being granted influence, the handling of ecological 
uncertainties and the baseline being used for acceptable risk comparisons. Firstly though, it 
is important to establish why GM crops can be understood as novel organisms. 
The Novel Nature Of GM Crops 
Proponents of biotechnology often argue that the genetic modification of crop plants is not a 
new phenomenon because traditional plant breeding programs have been altering the genes 
of crop plants for thousands of years (Tester 2001). It has also been emphasised that 
biotechnology, which may be broadly understood as the use of living organisms for the 
creation of goods and services, has been in operation for centuries through such well 
accepted processes as the brewing of beer and the making of cheese (Agrifood Awareness 
Australia 2002). However, the modern biotechnological technique of recombinant DNA 
technology, a technique more commonly called genetic engineering but perhaps more 
accurately referred to as genetic modification, can be distinguished as a significantly different 
development. In proposing that this technique and the organisms created through it are 
significantly novel, I refer to the types of genetic combinations now possible and the way in 
which these combinations are achieved. 
One of the broad classification systems of living organisms used by biologists is that of the 5 
kingdoms: plants, animals, fungi, monera (a kingdom that contains all prokaryotes, which are 
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distinguished as unicellular organisms with internal parts not bound by membranes, such as 
bacteria) and protista (simple eukaryotes, or simple organisms with a membrane bound 
nucleus such as algae and protozoa) (Campbell 2002, p. 522). Many of the GM plants 
currently being commercialised represent ‘transkingdom’ genetic crosses because their 
creation has involved the transfer of genetic material from bacteria and viruses into the 
genetic makeup of crop plants, or in other words, into crop plant genomes. Conventional 
plant breeding programs have only been capable of combining genetic information from 
closely related species. This new ability to combine genetic information from across 
biological kingdoms means that the range, and nature, of genetic combinations made 
possible by this recombinant DNA technology are significantly different from those 
combinations achievable through conventional breeding. GM crops can therefore be seen as 
novel organisms in the sense that humanity has not previously been capable of creating 
transkingdom genetic combinations and transkingdom GM crops have not previously existed 
in the environment on a scale equivalent to that of commercial production. 
While this new ability to combine genetic information from across biological kingdoms makes 
the crop varieties produced through recombinant DNA technology significantly different from 
those produced through conventional breeding, it is important to note that certain bacteria 
are also capable of achieving some degree of transkingdom genetic combination. For 
example, crown gall disease in plants is the result of a particular bacterium, Agrobacterium 
tumefaciens, inserting its own bacterial DNA into a plant’s genome. Indeed many 
biotechnologists use this particular bacterium to deliver their DNA of choice into the genetic 
makeup of crop plants. It may be argued that this ability of some bacteria to cross their own 
genetic information with that of organisms from another biological kingdom represents a 
challenge to the claimed novelty of the transkingdom nature of GM crops. What I was 
suggesting in the above paragraph, however, was that the ability to cross biological 
kingdoms is a new capability for humanity and therefore, that GM crops could be 
distinguished as significantly different from those crops developed through conventional 
breeding.  
In addition to representing a new human capability, however, transkingdom genetic 
combinations as achieved by humanity also differ from those achieved by bacteria in the 
sense that the DNA from more than one species is often being transferred. When a 
biotechnologist creates a transkingdom genetic combination, this often involves what is 
called a gene cassette, or a collection of bits and pieces of DNA taken from various 
organisms, such as a combination of viral and bacterial DNA. This use of a mixed cassette of 
genetic information when creating transkingdom genetic combinations can be seen to 
distinguish the human process from that undertaken by bacteria. It is also pertinent to 
highlight that in nature, the frequency of transkingdom crosses and the pathways available 
for the creation of these types of combinations have been described as being very limited 
(Nielsen et al. 1998; Droge, Pühler & Selbitschka 1998).  
Transkingdom GM crops can be seen to represent novel organisms then in the sense that 
human beings have not previously been capable of directing transkingdom genetic crosses 
to suit our own desires. Additionally, the range of combinations made possible through the 
development of recombinant DNA technology also represents a novel development in 
transkingdom genetic crosses, as DNA from viruses, bacteria, plants etc can now all be 
packaged together as a mixed cassette of DNA and transferred into an organism’s genetic 
makeup. This ability to combine genetic information from across various biological kingdoms 
makes recombinant DNA technology and the types of organisms achievable through it, 
significantly novel. The process for achieving this transfer of DNA across biological kingdoms 
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also represents another important aspect of the novelty of GM crops and one to which we 
now turn our attention. 
Using either physical (e.g. gene gun or electroporation) or biological (e.g. agrobacterium) 
means, the process of genetic engineering involves a transfer of foreign DNA into an 
organism’s genetic makeup, but the exact location at which the transferred DNA is 
incorporated into the genome is not controlled. This random insertion process represents 
another important element of the novelty associated with GM crops. The random insertion 
process used in recombinant DNA technologies has raised a number of concerns about the 
potential for pleiotropic and epistatic effects. In a general sense, these concerns can be 
understood as relating to how the random insertion of foreign DNA will impact on the 
organism’s overall genetic structure and function.  
A pleiotropic effect would be one in which the transferred DNA does not just produce the trait 
desired, but interacts with the rest of the genetic code to produce additional unintended 
effects. An epistatic effect would be where the random insertion process results in the other 
elements of the crop plant genome affecting the expression of the transferred DNA, such as 
when that transferred DNA is silenced. While many of the negative impacts of a random 
insertion process may be found before commercialisation during the screening and testing 
phase, it should be highlighted that the screening and testing of GM crops currently focuses 
on important agronomic and nutritional traits, and therefore may not detect all the changes 
that may have occurred in the plant’s secondary metabolism. A plant’s secondary 
metabolism refers to the processes occurring within the plant which are not associated 
directly with plant growth, or in this case, which do not relate directly to important agronomic 
traits. 
The novel nature of GM crops, which is a result of both the type of genetic combination and 
the process used to achieve it, means that there is no real precedent for understanding how 
the new transkingdom genetic combinations will affect the organism involved and its future 
evolution, or the way that organism and its new genetic makeup will interact with other 
biological systems, particularly when released into the environment on a large scale. There 
has been no long and established history of the safe use of transkingdom GM crops and 
what little empirical research is available on their ecological interactions has been hotly 
contested, with the interpretation of results being heavily debated within the scientific 
community. The novel nature of transkingdom GM crops and the lack of experience and data 
on their potential ecological interactions, means that the impact these crops will have on the 
environment is an area with a high degree of scientific uncertainty (Wolfenbarger & Phifer 
2000), and arguably even ignorance (Functowitz and Ravetz 1992).  
The novel nature of GM crops has also raised a host of new social and ethical questions. 
Many of the social and ethical questions being raised by the commercialisation of GM crops 
relate to much broader questions about how we conceptualise the natural world and the 
human relationship to it. One aspect of this is how the commercialisation of this new 
technology presents a challenge to a traditional concept of nature. In a traditional concept of 
nature, genetic information is seen as being predominantly transferable in a vertical sense 
from generation to generation, rather than in a horizontal sense between species or 
kingdoms. Indeed, in a traditional concept of nature what designates a group of organisms as 
a ‘species’ is primarily their ability to interbreed and exchange genetic information. The 
development of recombinant DNA technology is forcing society to reconceptualise the notion 
of species boundaries and accept that nature is now infinitely malleable (Midgely 2000). This 
challenge to a traditional concept of nature has seen a debate develop around whether these 
crops can be considered ‘natural’ and whether they represent the conduct of an ethical 
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relationship between humanity and the rest of the biotic community. An example of this type 
of debate can be observed when the ‘Playing God’ argument is invoked by opponents to 
gene technologies because it is essentially an argument about what can be considered 
‘natural’ and what constitutes an ethical relationship between humanity and the rest of the 
natural world.  
In many cases, the ethical questions being raised in relation to GM crops are connected to 
the current social context surrounding and influencing the technology’s development and 
deployment. By this, I mean that many of the ethical concerns being raised in the GM debate 
are concerned with what is right and wrong in relation to socio-political and economic 
arrangements. Debates over what are ideal socio-political and economic structures are 
certainly perennial debates extending well beyond biotechnology. However, many opponents 
to biotechnology see it as a technological development which embodies a particular socio-
political program (Wynne 1991). The technology’s development and commercialisation 
therefore raises interconnected social and ethical concerns relating to the appropriateness of 
the socio-political and economic arrangements being embodied by the technology. The 
involvement of large multinational corporations (particularly chemical corporations) in the 
creation of agricultural biotechnologies and the use of intellectual property in the form of 
patents, are just two areas where the commercialisation of GM crops is raising new and 
interconnected social and ethical questions.  
Various analysts of the debate over the deliberate environmental release of genetically 
modified organisms have suggested that this is not simply a debate between the ignorant 
and the scientifically informed. Instead, it is variously described as a debate about values 
and attitudes (Kershen 2003), a debate involving philosophical ideas, ideology and politics 
(Regal 1996), a quarrel about dogmas (Rehmann-Sutter 1993) or a debate involving deeper 
concerns related to alternative visions of reality (Bruce 2002). In this sense, the debate over 
GM crops can be seen to be trans-scientific (Weinberg 1985), a debate that involves 
questions beyond which science is capable of answering. This includes questions of value, 
questions of environmental ethics and questions about what constitutes appropriate social 
arrangements. Amidst all of the broad scientific, social and ethical questions being raised in 
the GM debate, governments are responsible for providing a regulatory framework for GM 
crops, which is capable of minimising negative impacts on both the biological and social 
environments. To assist the development of socially and ecologically sustainable agriculture, 
the regulatory framework would need to be capable of incorporating and considering all 
aspects of the GM debate, scientific, social and ethical. 
Australia’s Regulation Of GM Crops  
As a means of assessing and regulating the commercial release of GM crops, Australia has 
adopted what can be described as a science-based risk assessment approach to regulation. 
In 2000 the Gene Technology Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) created the federal 
regulatory body, the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR). The object of the Act 
is described as “to protect the health and safety of people, and to protect the environment, by 
identifying risks posed by or as a result of gene technology, and by managing those risks 
through regulating certain dealings with GMOs” (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, p. 1).  
The Act has therefore framed Australia’s regulation of GM crops in terms of risk, where risk 
assessment is seen as a technical endeavour involving scientific quantification. Indeed, the 
risk analysis framework used by the OGTR explicitly states that “risk assessment is a 
scientific process that does not take political or other non-scientific aspects of an application 
to use a GMO into account” (Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 2002, p. 12). Framing 
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regulatory considerations in terms of risk and using a risk analysis framework that denies the 
consideration of political and non-scientific aspects of risk debates, means that moral and 
social concerns are effectively excluded from explicit consideration in regulatory decision 
making.  
In a more general sense, a risk analysis framework which claims that risk assessment is a 
purely scientific process is a particularly technocratic approach to the notion of risk and one 
which completely fails to acknowledge the influence subjective judgements have on the risk 
assessment process itself and how this process is framed. This purely science-based 
approach to understanding risk assessment ignores the values and politics which are 
embedded in the framework adopted for decision making (Jasanoff 1999), how values enter 
the scientific process through the way experiments are structured and organised, as well as 
what meaning is determined from the observations (Shrader-Frechette 1991), and the 
subjective elements that inevitably enter any risk assessment process when decisions must 
be made about what constitutes acceptable evidence. While the explicit consideration of 
social and ethical concerns is not currently occurring in Australia’s regulation of GM crops, 
the framework being used for decision making and the way the risk assessment process 
proceeds are not entirely value-free as is currently being implied in the risk analysis 
framework. 
This exclusion of social and ethical considerations in GM crop regulation is also reflected in 
how the environment is defined. The definition given to ‘the environment’ effectively sets the 
scope for what issues can be considered in any risk assessment process that considers 
‘risks to the environment’. The Gene Technology Act has a less comprehensive definition of 
the environment than other governmental documents such as the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 and State of the Environment reporting (Vanclay 
2003). The shortened definition of the environment in the Gene Technology Act excludes any 
mention of people and communities as forming part of the environment, as well as excluding 
any mention of social, cultural, aesthetic or economic qualities of an understanding of what 
constitutes the environment. It is worth highlighting this point by reproducing the definitions in 
their entirety here. 
The Gene Technology Act 2000 (Section 10) defines ‘the environment’ to include: 
a) ecosystems and their constituent parts; and 
b) natural and physical resources; and 
c) the qualities and characteristics of locations, places and areas. 
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC) 
(Section 528) defines the environment as including: 
a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and 
communities; and 
b) all natural and physical resources; and 
c) the qualities and characteristics of locations, places and areas, however 
large or small, that contribute to their biological diversity and integrity, 
intrinsic or attributed scientific value or interest, amenity, harmony and 
sense of community; and 
d) the social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions that effect, or are 
affected by, things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c). 
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While it may be argued that point (c) of the Gene Technology Act’s definition may be 
understood as referring to broader social and ethical aspects of what is defined as ‘the 
environment’, the explanatory memorandum to the Act suggests otherwise (Vanclay 2003). 
In the explanatory memorandum (p 48) it is stated that, ‘It is intended that the definition of 
environment include all animals (including insects, fish and mammals), plants, soils and 
ecosystems (both aquatic and terrestrial)’. Through providing a much narrower definition of 
the key term ‘the environment’ than other pieces of environmental legislation, the Gene 
Technology Act 2000 frames Australia’s regulation of GM crops in a way that further denies 
any consideration of social or ethical factors from entering the risk assessment process as 
performed by the OGTR.  
Australia’s regulatory framework does include advisory committees which have been 
established to consider social and ethical aspects of biotechnological applications; these are 
the Gene Technology Community Consultative Committee (GTCCC) and the Gene 
Technology Ethics Committee (GTEC). However, the Act has legislated that it is only the 
committee of scientific experts (the Gene Technology Technical Advisory Committee 
GTTAC) that must be consulted during the risk assessment process for all applications for 
deliberate environmental release (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, pp. 33-34). It is clearly 
stated in section 51 of the Act that “the Regulator must take into account…any advice in 
relation to the risk assessment provided by the Gene Technology Technical Advisory 
Committee” (Commonwealth of Australia 2000 p.34), but no mention is made in this section 
of the GTEC or GTCCC. Indeed, the Regulator is not required by legislation to take into 
account any advice offered by these committees in relation to risk assessment. Of course the 
Regulator may take the advice of these committees into account, but under current 
legislation there is no requirement that this advice be routinely sought on individual 
applications or taken into account when offered. The fact that the GTEC and the GTCCC do 
not have to be consulted on individual applications and that their advice does not have to be 
taken into account by the regulator when it is made, is a factor of regulatory framing which 
severely limits the influence these committees have over the decision making process.  
We can observe this lack of influence that the non-scientific advisory committees to the 
OGTR have in decision making in at least two instances. Before approval was given for the 
commercial release of GM canola in 2003, the GTCCC chose to advise the Regulator that “a 
state of unreadiness exists concerning the risks to the environment of the commercial 
release of GM canola, so significant that the applications should be declined at this time” 
(GTCCC communiqué 2003). As evidence of the lack of influence the GTCCC has on 
regulatory decision making, this advice was not taken and the first GM canola crop received 
regulatory approval. The lack of influence held by the non-scientific advisory committees is 
further evidenced by transkingdom GM crops being approved for commercial release before 
the GTEC has completed its investigation into the ethics of transkingdom crosses (GTEC 
communiqué 2003). With the Regulator granting approval to GM crops before investigations 
from the non-scientific advisory committees have been completed and not acting on advice 
given when those investigations are complete, it becomes obvious that even though 
community consultative and ethics committees exist within Australia’s regulatory framework, 
they have not been granted the same degree of influence over the decision making process 
as that granted to the committee of scientific experts.  
The framing of Australia’s regulatory approach to GM crops has effectively excluded social 
and ethical considerations from explicitly entering the decision-making process through the 
type of approach selected, the definition of key terms and what parties have been granted 
influence. This exclusion of social and ethical considerations denies the concept of a social 
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risk. Social risks can be defined as the risks of negative impacts on social structure or the 
violation of basic moral tenets (Wynne 1983). In research looking at how comfortable 
Australians are with current technological developments, Gilding and Critchley (2003) 
discovered that most Australians are uncomfortable with genetic engineering technologies. If 
concerns in the community about GM crops relate to how the commercialisation of these 
novel organisms will impact on social structure or basic moral tenets, then these are 
concerns that are not currently able to enter and influence the decision making process. This 
disenfranchisement of legitimate social and ethical concerns from regulatory decision making 
on these novel organisms can be viewed as a serious threat to the advancement of socially 
sustainable agriculture. The development of socially sustainable agriculture is also 
threatened by Australia’s current regulatory framework for GM crops in the sense that 
continuing to approve GM crops for commercial release - without acknowledging the 
potential for social risks and without allowing social and ethical concerns to penetrate the 
decision making process - may encourage the development of agricultural systems which are 
not capable of maintaining the trust and support of the majority of Australian citizens.  
Framing the current regulatory approach to GM crops as one of scientific risk assessment 
also potentially threatens the development of ecologically sustainable agriculture. There has 
been widespread agreement among ecologists that the current body of ecological knowledge 
is insufficient to enable an accurate prediction of the impact that large scale commercial 
releases of GM crops may have on the environment (Käppeli & Auberson 1997; Johnson & 
Hope 2000; Beringer 2000). The novel nature of genetically modified organisms and the 
existence of little actual ecological data on their environmental impact, means that regulatory 
decision making is heavily reliant on OGTR risk evaluators and GTTAC scientists who are 
being asked to make inferences and draw conclusions from very little actual data. As novel 
organisms, the risks from transkingdom GM crops are not necessarily known risks with a 
quantifiable degree of uncertainty. Risk assessment in this data deficient context begins to 
take on a character more like educated guesswork than precise and certain scientific 
quantification.  
Recognising the difficulties of performing accurate risk assessment when there is little 
familiarity with the organisms involved, when these organisms are being released into 
complex systems and when there is little actual data available, the CSIRO recently held a 
workshop on the ecological risk assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and 
came up with a ten point plan for best practice ecological risk assessment (CSIRO 2002). 
Three of these ten points relate to how uncertainties should be handled, and point five of this 
ten point plan states that “It is essential to include a transparent analysis of uncertainty” in 
risk assessments performed on GMOs (CSIRO 2002). While there are a number of models 
available for analysing ecological uncertainties (Linacre 2003), not one of these models has 
been transparently employed in risk assessments performed by the OGTR. There is currently 
no clear and transparent acknowledgement of scientific uncertainties and areas of ignorance 
in Australia’s GM crop regulation and this is despite the government’s primary scientific 
research institution suggesting that this is a vital element of best practice ecological risk 
assessment for GMOs.  
Compounding this problem of not transparently analysing ecological uncertainties, the OGTR 
has not imposed detailed ongoing ecological monitoring as a condition of licence for all crops 
that have been approved for commercial release. While applicants are required to report any 
negative environmental impacts of which they become aware, requesting that negative 
environmental impacts be reported by the licence holder when they are noticed is not the 
same thing as requesting that detailed ecological monitoring for negative impacts be 
©Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 2004 43 
http://www.swin.edu.au/ajets 
AJETS Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, pp: 36-47 
conducted a condition of licence approval. Without acknowledging where our knowledge 
deficits are substantial and without long term independent ecological monitoring of these 
novel crops being enforced for all approved GM crops, our ability to foresee, quantify and 
manage any negative ecological impacts these crops may have, and therefore our ability to 
ensure the ecologically sustainable development of agriculture, has been substantially 
compromised. 
The baseline of comparison used by the OGTR for what level of risk is acceptable also raises 
concern about the appropriateness of the current approach to GM crop regulation for 
advancing the goal of sustainable agriculture. A potential risk to the environment from a GM 
crop is deemed to be acceptable by the OGTR if that level of risk is seen as no greater than 
that posed by conventional chemically intensive agriculture. The rationale behind this 
baseline for acceptable risk comparisons is that the risks posed to the environment by 
conventional agricultural practices have already been accepted by society and therefore, as 
long as the levels of risk posed by GM crops are no greater, then they too should be 
considered acceptable. This ignores literature on risk from the social sciences that suggests 
that people use a range of different factors to decide what an acceptable level of risk is, 
factors such as familiarity, controllability and reversibility (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 
1982). If these factors were included in considerations of acceptable levels of risk for GM 
crops, we may very well find that the Australian people are not prepared to accept a lower 
level of physical risk to the environment from GM crops in comparison to the risks from 
conventional agriculture because the risks from GM crops are seen as unfamiliar, 
uncontrollable and irreversible. One could also argue that setting chemically intensive 
conventional agricultural practices as the comparative baseline for risk acceptability is setting 
a particularly low standard by which to judge the environmental impact of GM crops, 
especially given the unfamiliar, uncontrollable and irreversible nature of these impacts. 
An even more fundamental critique of using conventional chemically intensive agriculture as 
the baseline of comparison is that this assumes that the public does indeed consider the 
levels of risk to the environment from conventional agriculture as acceptable. One could 
however argue that if the Australian public was fully informed about the practices occurring in 
conventional agriculture or if the public were given a choice between intensive chemical use 
and a more benign alternative, then the level of risk to the environment from conventional 
agriculture could in fact be rejected as unacceptable. Setting chemically intensive agriculture 
as the sole baseline for acceptable risk comparisons is assuming that the public is fully 
informed about current agricultural practices, and that even if given a choice, these practices 
and the levels of risk they pose to the environment would be deemed acceptable by the 
broader public both now and into the future. I would argue that this is a highly questionable 
set of assumptions. 
Through failing to acknowledge and adequately address the high degree of uncertainty that 
surrounds the long term environmental impact of these novel crops, and through the 
selection of chemically intensive conventional agriculture as the only baseline of comparison 
for deciding what represents an acceptable level of risk, the framing of Australia’s regulatory 
decision making for GM crops does not support the development of an ecologically 
sustainable agriculture. 
Conclusions 
As it is always easier to be critical rather than constructive, I would like to conclude by 
suggesting that there are a number of ways in which the regulation of GM crops in Australia 
could be altered to help advance the development of socially and ecologically sustainable 
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agriculture. The option requiring least disturbance to existing institutions would be for the 
GTCCC and the GTEC to be given a broader role to play in risk assessment and decision 
making. This would enable social and ethical considerations to be incorporated into 
regulatory deliberations, enhancing the ability of the regulatory system to advance the 
development of socially sustainable agriculture. Another way to assist ecological and social 
sustainability with minimal institutional change would be for areas with a high degree of 
scientific uncertainty, such as the impact of GM crops on soil communities and fertility, to be 
made more transparent and subject to broader consultation with the community. Within the 
Gene Technology Act, the Regulator is permitted to undertake any action considered 
appropriate for making a decision on an application, including holding a public hearing 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2000, p.36). Both socially and ecologically sustainable 
agriculture may be better advanced if public hearings were to be held to discuss how 
decisions should be made in areas where scientific uncertainties are substantial and where 
the potential for irreversible effects exists. Alternatively, the Gene Technology Act could be 
amended to incorporate advancing the goal of sustainable agriculture as an objective, as 
Norway has done (Myhr and Traavik, 2003), and indeed, as was suggested by the Australian 
Conservation Foundation and the Australian Democrats during the Senate inquiry into the 
Gene Technology Bill which proceeded the development of the Act (Senate Committee 
2000).  
As a substantially different approach, we could begin to shift away from a risk assessment 
framework of decision making towards an approach such as Alternatives Assessment 
(O’Brien 2000) or Multi-criteria Mapping (Stirling & Mayer 1999). Either of these approaches 
would enable a broader range of concerns and comparisons for impact assessment to be 
incorporated into the decision making process. Alternatively, we could begin to develop far 
more proactive approaches to regulation and innovation based on shared future visions or 
technological trajectories (for e.g. see Costanza, 2000). An interesting Australian example of 
how a shared future vision may begin to be articulated and incorporated into governmental 
decision-making can be seen in Tasmania’s “Tasmania Together” project. Widespread 
community consultation was undertaken in Tasmania to unearth and document the visions 
local citizens had for various aspects of the island’s future. This document was generated to 
serve as a guide to State and Local political decision-making. While the adequacy of the 
process of the document’s generation and the extent to which it has influenced policy 
decisions can of course be debated and potentially improved upon, the existence of this 
project shows that the idea of generating shared social visions as a way of guiding policy 
decisions is not a totally foreign concept in Australia. All of these suggestions indicate that 
there are ways in which Australia’s regulation of GM crops could be altered to aid the 
advancement of socially and ecologically sustainable agriculture. 
Despite all the inherent difficulties with the concept of sustainable development, the term 
remains important for its ability to open a space for the synthesis of ecological, economic and 
ethical considerations in political decision making. This is a synthesis that desperately needs 
to be brought to Australia’s currently narrowly framed, fragmented and largely undemocratic 
approach to the regulation of controversial transkingdom GM crops. 
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